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We develop an equilibrium model of the US labor market, fit to
Panel Study of Income Dynamics data from 1968–96. Our main
innovation is a finer differentiation of types of labor than in prior
work (i.e., by occupation, education, gender, and age). This lets us
fit wage and employment patterns better than simpler models. We
obtain a good fit towages and occupational choices over the 29-year
period while also explaining college attendance rates. We use the
model to assess factors driving changes in thewage structure.Occu-
pational demand shifts and shifts in demand for college labor and fe-
male labor within occupations are key factors.
I. Introduction
There is a vast literature on the evolution of the US wage structure over
the past 40 years. By “wage structure,” we refer to patterns of wage differ-
entials across demographic groups, usually characterized by education,
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gender, occupation, and age. The most widely noted change over this pe-
riod was the growth, since roughly 1976, of the college/high school wage
premium, despite growth in the relative supply of college graduates. In the
early 1990s, the consensus view of the profession attributed this growth in
relativewages ofmore highly skilled labor to “skill-biased technical change”
(SBTC) that drove up the rental price of skill in general.1
But the consensus began to crack in the early 2000s. Card and DiNardo
(2002) and Eckstein andNagypal (2004) look at the wage structure inmore
detail, examining not just the college premium but also (i) the college pre-
mium by age, (ii) gender and race gaps, (iii) relative wages across occupa-
tions, (iv) wage/experience profiles by education and gender, and so forth.
In doing so they findmany patterns that SBTC alone cannot explain.Other
factors must also be at work.
For example, Card and Lemieux (2001) noted that the increase in the col-
lege premium is concentrated among young workers and that this could be
explained by reduced relative supply of young college graduates. But, as
they note, it is puzzling why the supply of young graduates stagnated even
as the college premium soared in the 1980s. Clearly, to explain changes in
wages and in education and employment choices simultaneously, one needs
an equilibrium model.
With thismotivation, we build an equilibriummodel with labor differen-
tiated along the four dimensions of interest noted above (education, occu-
pation, gender, age) and with five key sources of change in the wage struc-
ture (SBTC, capital-skill complementarity,2 occupational demand shifts,
demographic changes, and changing tastes for work and college). We seek
to explain changes in wages and employment over the 1968–96 period at
a detailed level using this model.
Our work differs from (most) earlier work in this area in three keyways:
First is the fine distinction among types of labor and the attempt to fit data
patterns by narrowly defined type. Second is the inclusion of several fac-
tors that may drive changes in the wage structure (i.e., most earlier work
looks at only one or two factors at a time—most often SBTC and supply
shifts). Third is the equilibrium nature of the analysis, accounting for both
labor supply and college attendance.
With few exceptions, the prior literature on the evolution of the wage
structure has been descriptive and/or partial equilibrium in nature. It has
1 See, e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and
Welch (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994), andGottschalk andMoffitt (1994).Describing the consensus of the literature,
Card and DiNardo (2002) state that “the recent rise in wage inequality is usually at-
tributed to skill-biased technical change” (733) and that “the recent inequality litera-
ture reaches virtually unanimous agreement” (734).
2 Fallon and Layard (1975) and Krusell et al. (2000) favor this story over SBTC.
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not attempted to build equilibriummodels that explain the evolution of the
wage structure while simultaneously explaining educational and employ-
ment/occupational choices. The notable exceptions are Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998a, 1998b), Lee (2005), and Lee and Wolpin (2006, 2010).
The main distinction between our work and earlier equilibrium models
is that we allow many more types of labor to be imperfect substitutes in
production. InHeckman et al. (1998a, 1998b), there are two types of labor:
college and high school. In contrast, Lee (2005) differentiates labor by both
education and occupation (white- vs. blue-collar) to get four types. In
Lee and Wolpin (2006, 2010) there are six types that are imperfect substi-
tutes in production (three occupations in both the goods and service sec-
tors). Lee and Wolpin also differentiate labor by education, gender, and
age, but these types differ only in tastes and/or skill levels. In contrast to our
study, they are perfect substitutes in production.
Notably, Heckman et al. and Lee obtain opposite answers to the ques-
tion of how an increase in the supply of college labor affects the college
wage premium. Heckman et al. estimate a large effect while Lee finds
that it is negligible. The difference arises because Heckman et al. do not
model substitution between education types within occupations while,
at the other extreme, Lee assumes that education types are perfect substi-
tutes within occupations. Obviously one’s assumptions about substitut-
ability among types of labor make a big difference when assessing the role
of supply versus demand factors in changing the college premium (as well
as other aspects of the wage structure). Thus, to address such questions, we
feel it is important to allow for as many types of labor as possible and to
allow for as flexible a pattern of substitution between types as possible.
Even prior work on the wage structure that is partial equilibrium or de-
scriptive in nature has, for the most part, looked at only a few types of la-
bor, often differentiated only by education or by very broad skill groups.3
But as Card and Lemieux (2001), Card and DiNardo (2002), and Eckstein
and Nagypal (2004) show, a broad perspective may lead one to miss more
subtle patterns that are key to understanding what drives changes in the
wage structure. They stress the importance of looking at education, gender,
age, and occupation. The importance of occupation in particular has been
stressed byMoscarini and Vella (2002), Kranz (2006), and Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008, 2009a, 2009b). They argue that occupation is a better
measure of skill than education and that occupational demand shifts are
crucial for understanding changes in the wage structure. This motivates us
to (i) differentiate labor by occupation and (ii) allow for occupational de-
3 As an exception, in one analysis, Katz and Murphy (1992) looked at labor dif-
ferentiated into 64 education, gender, and age cells. This allowed them to see that
SBTC could not explain narrowing of the male/female wage gap.
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mand shifts. As we will show, our model does a good job of explaining
wage changes by occupation.
To anticipate a key finding, an awkward fact for the pure SBTC hypoth-
esis is that, while wages and employment of high school males began to fall
in the mid-1970s, high school females did well on both dimensions. Eck-
stein and Nagypal (2004) note the importance of this pattern. Our model
explains it by (i) imperfect substitution of genders, (ii) a demand shift to-
ward (heavily female) service occupations, and (iii) technical change favor-
ing women within occupations.
Notably, Lee and Wolpin (2010) explain increased relative wages of
women via (a) an exogenous decline in fertility and (b) a shift in demand to-
ward service occupations. This leads to skill upgrading: women expect to
work more so they acquire more human capital. However, as males and fe-
males are perfect substitutes in their model, they may have difficulty ex-
plaining the increase in relative wages of women within education/occupa-
tion cells that is a key feature of the data. This is another motivation for a
finer differentiation among types of labor in production.
Thus, our main goal is to estimate an equilibrium model of the labor
market with many more types of labor than in prior work. Specifically,
we differentiate labor by education (college vs. high school), gender, age
(four 10-year intervals from 25 to 64), and 10 occupations (roughly the
one-digit level). This gives 2  2  4  105160 types of labor that enter
a multilevel nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate pro-
duction technology. The greater richness of the model may lead to a more
reliable assessment of what factors were important in driving changes in
the wage structure.
We fit our model to Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from
1968–96 on (annual) wages and employment of each of the 160 types of la-
bor. In addition, for each cohort of 19-year-old youths from 1968 to 1990,
we fit the fraction of males and females from each of four parental back-
ground types who choose to attend college. A key challenge for our model
is to explain the stagnation, noted by Card and Lemieux (2001), of college
attendance rates in the 1970s and 1980s despite the rising college wage pre-
mium. As we see in figure 1, the model does a good job of tracking this pat-
tern.And, inmost cases, themodel also does quite a good jobof tracking the
wage and employment paths for all 160 types of labor over the 29 years of
our data.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II presents our
model, and Section III describes the PSID data used in estimation. Sec-
tions IV–VI present our estimation results. Section VII discusses the fit of
the model and in so doing describes many interesting patterns in the data.
Section VIII presents counterfactual simulations, and Section IX presents
conclusions.
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FIG. 1.—Education choice at age 19 (percentage attending college)
II. An Overlapping-Generations Equilibrium Model
of the Labor Market
In each year the population of the model economy consists of overlap-
ping generations of individuals aged 19–64. Youths enter the economy at
age 19 and decide whether or not to attend college. At that point, there are
eight types of people, differentiated by gender and four levels of parental ed-
ucation, that is, whether the best-educated parent’s completed educationwas
less than high school (< HS), high school (HS), some college (SC), or col-
lege (COL). These eight types have different “costs” of college attendance.
The competitively determined college earnings premium determines the
proportion of each type that attends. Thus, the supply of college labor is
endogenous. We describe the decision rule for college attendance in detail
in Section II.C.
All individuals (regardless of their schooling decision) enter the labor
force at age 25.4 After that, a worker’s type is determined solely by gender,
age, and own education (i.e., parents’ education no longermatters).5 In each
year (through age 64) workers choose either working in the home sector or
working in one of 10 (roughly one-digit) occupations. Workers make oc-
cupational choices on the basis of the current vector of competitively deter-
mined occupational wages, which is education-gender-age specific. Work-
ers also have type-specific nonpecuniary payoffs to each occupation. We
describe the occupational choice decision rule in detail in Section II.B.
Given the occupational choice decision, the model contains 160 types
of labor that are allowed to be imperfect substitutes in production. Types
are distinguished by education (college vs. high school), gender, age (four
categories), and occupation (10 categories). These 160 types of labor, along
with the aggregate capital stock, are combined, via a nested CES produc-
tion function, into aggregate output. We describe the production function
in detail in Section II.A.
In eachyear, the equilibriumof the economy is a 160-vector of occupation-
education-age-gender-specificwages such that themarket for each skill type
clears. Let Xg;e;a;t denote the type (g, e, a)–specific aggregate supply of labor
to the economy at time t, where g denotes gender, e denotes education,
and a denotes age. This is governed by the sizes, gender composition, and
educational choices of past cohorts. Let Lg;e;a;k;t denote the type (g, e, a)–
specific supply of labor to occupation k at time t. This is governed by the
function Dg;e;ak ð  ;  Þ:
Lg;e;a;k;t5D
g;e;a
k ½fwg;e;a;k;tg10k5 1; Xg;e;a;t; ð1Þ
4 We assume that work starts at age 25 largely because of data limitations that we
discuss in Sec. III.
5 This is consistent with results in the study by Geweke and Keane (2000), who
find, using a subsample of these same data, that parental background is insignificant
in earnings functions that control for own education and experience.
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which says that the supply of (g, e, a) labor to occupation k depends on
wages fwg;e;a;k;tgk5 1;10, aggregate supplies fXg;e;a;tg, and group-specific tastes
for occupations (and the home sector).
Equilibriumwages are given bypartials of the aggregate production func-
tion, evaluated at the aggregate capital stock At and the type-specific labor
aggregates fLg;e;a;k;tg:
wg;e;a;k;t5 fLg;k;e;a;tðAt; ffffDg;e;ak ½fwg;e;a;k;tg10k51; Xg;e;a;tg10k51g2g51g2e51g4a51Þ: ð2Þ
Thus, at the equilibriumwage vector, individual labor supply decisions give
type-specific labor supplies to occupations that equate wages to marginal
products for each type in each occupation.
Solving for equilibria in all years from1968 to 1996 is an iterative sequential
process. In each year, the equilibrium wage vector solves a 160-dimensional
fixed-point problem. We must solve these problems sequentially; that is, the
solution in 1968 determines the supply of college labor that enters in 1974 and
so forth.6 We present the solution procedure in appendix A, available in the
online version of the article. The solution serves as input to estimation, which
we discuss in Section II.E after describing the model in detail.
A. Form of the Production Technology
The model incorporates imperfect substitution among labor inputs via a
nested CES production function with several levels. One might order CES
nests of labor differentiated by occupation, education, gender, and age in
manyways, butwe view our ordering as natural.We place occupations in the
upper-level nests, as labor of multiple occupations must typically be com-
bined to produce products or services—not necessarily labor of different ed-
ucation, gender, or age levels. We felt that education should come next, as it
seems intuitive that education is the primary determinant of the quality of an
occupation’s workers. The ordering of gender versus age is not so obvious.
We chose to put gender next and age last, and the model fits well that way.
At the top level, aggregate output depends on capital (A) andCES aggre-
gates of “skilled” and “unskilled” labor, denoted EMPs and EMPu, respec-
tively. Thus we have
Y5 f ðÞ5bfls½lAArs 1 ð12lAÞEMPrss ru=rs 1 ð12lsÞEMPruu g1=ru ; ð3Þ
where b5 exp½bð0Þ1 bð1Þ  t is a scale and technical progress (total factor
productivity [TFP]) parameter. The l’s are “share” parameters that gov-
ern income shares for each input, while the r’s (r < 1) govern the elasticity
6 We take the initial 1968 distribution of types of labor Xg;e;a;1968 as exogenous.
Then, X evolves as a result of the demographics and educational choices of incom-
ing cohorts. Because we assume that the cohort of 19-year-olds who make college
choices in 1968 do not enter the labor market until age 25, we actually takeX to be
exogenously given up until 1974.
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of substitution between inputs. Of course the l’s translate literally into in-
come shares only in the Cobb-Douglas special case that arises if r→ 0 (see
Arrow et al. 1961).
The elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor is js5
1=ð12rsÞ, while that between the capital-skill composite and unskilled la-
bor is ju5 1=ð12 ruÞ. We have capital-skill complementarity, meaning
that growth in the capital stock increases relative demand for skilled la-
bor, if ru> rs, which implies ju> js. Our top-level setup is similar to that
in Fallon and Layard (1975) and Krusell et al. (2000), except we define skill
along occupational (not educational) lines.
At the second-level nest we have skilled (EMPs) and unskilled (EMPu)
labor aggregates:
EMPs5 ½l1EMPrH1 1 ð12l1ÞEMPrH2 1=rH ;
EMPu5 ½luEMPrLu1 1 ð12luÞEMPrLu21=rL :
ð4Þ
Skilled labor combines labor in occupations 1 and 2 (professionals and
managers). Unskilled labor combines labor in the service and blue-collar
occupations, EMPu1 and EMPu2, respectively.
At the next level, the service sector input (EMPu1) is a CES aggregate of
employment in occupations 3–6 (technicians, sales, clerical, and narrow
services), while blue-collar (EMPu2) is a CES aggregate of occupations
7–10 (craft workers, operatives, transport operatives, and laborers):
EMPu15½l3EMPru13 1 l4EMPru14 1 l5EMPru15 1 ð12l32l42l5ÞEMPru16 1=ru1 ;
EMPu25½l7EMPru27 1 l8EMPru28 1 l9EMPru29 1 ð12l72l82l9ÞEMPru210 1=ru2 :
ð5Þ
Thus, the parameter ru1 governs substitution among the four service sector
occupations, while ru2 governs substitution among the four blue-collar oc-
cupations.
Next we consider occupation-level effective labor inputs. Each occupa-
tional labor input is assumed to consist of an aggregate of college and high
school labor as follows:
EMPk5 ½mkHSrek 1 ð12mkÞCOLrek 1=re for k5 1; 10; ð6Þ
where HSk and COLk denote high school and college type labor in occu-
pation k, respectively. Note that the CES share parameters mk are allowed
to vary across the 10 occupations, but the education substitution parameter
re is assumed to be common across all occupations.
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At the next nesting level, the amounts of college and high school labor
supplied to each occupation are assumed to consist of male and female
workers. Thus we have
HSk5 ½ykðHSmalek Þrg 1 ð12 ykÞðHSfemalek Þrg 1=rg ;
COLk5 ½gkðCOLmalek Þrg 1 ð12gkÞðCOLfemalek Þrg 1=rg
ð7Þ
for k 5 1, 10. The elasticity of substitution between genders is common
across occupation/education cells and is governed by rg. But the share param-
eters yk and gk can differ by occupation/education level.
The final CES nest aggregates labor in four different age groups: 25–34,
35–44, 45–54, and 55–64. These generate four gender/education level in-
puts as follows:
HSmalek 5 ½t1kðHSmalek;25–34Þra 1 t2kðHSmalek;35–44Þra 1 t3kðHSmalek;45–54Þra
1 ð12 t1k2 t2k2 t3kÞðHSmalek;55–64Þra 1=ra ;
ð8aÞ
HSfemalek 5 ½j1kðHSfemalek;25–34Þra 1 j2kðHSfemalek;35–44Þra 1 j3kðHSfemalek;45–54Þra
1 ð12 j1k2 j2k2 j3kÞðHSfemalek;55–64Þra 1=ra ;
ð8bÞ
COLmalek 5 ½n1kðCOLmalek;25–34Þra 1 n2kðCOLmalek;35–44Þra 1 n3kðCOLmalek;45–54Þra
1 ð12 n1k2 n2k2 n3kÞðCOLmalek;55–64Þra 1=ra ;
ð8cÞ
COLfemalek 5 ½v1kðCOLfemalek;25–34Þra 1 v2kðCOLfemalek;35–44Þra 1 v3kðCOLfemalek;45–54Þra
1 ð12 v1k2 v2k2 v3kÞðCOLfemalek;55–64Þra 1=ra ;
ð8dÞ
where k5 1, 10 denotes occupation. The degree of substitutability between
age groups is common across occupation/education/gender cells and is
governed by the single parameter ra. But the share parameters tk, jk, nk, and
v k are allowed to differ by occupation/gender/education level. Aswe see in
(8), only the labor aggregates for education/gender/occupation/age cells
enter our model. (The model is fit to these 160 aggregate cells over the
29 years of the sample.)
As is standard in thewage structure literature, we let the share parameters
vary over time to capture SBTC and other factors that shift demand for dif-
ferent types of labor. Specifically, we let them follow low-order polyno-
mials in time, using logistic transformations to constrain them to lie in the
(0, 1) interval. For example, in the top-level nest (eq. [3]), we specify that
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li5
expðli0 1 li1t1 li2t2 1 li3t3 1 li4t4Þ
11 expðli0 1 li1t1 li2t2 1 li3t3 1 li4t4Þ; i5 s; A: ð9Þ
Thus, the capital share parameter lA and the capital/skilled labor aggregate
share ls are allowed to follow fourth-order polynomials in time. Similar
expressions apply to the other share parameters.
As we will see below, fourth-order polynomials provide a good fit to
the data. This is perhaps not surprising for two reasons. First, it is plausible
that technical change and/or shifts in relative demand for different types of
labor would occur gradually (and smoothly) over time. Second, the share
parameters may also be shifted by short-run macro shocks. But the sample
period contained only two large macro shocks: the severe recessions of
1974–75 and 1982.7 Thus, it is plausible that low-order polynomials are ad-
equate to capture the labor demand shifts over the 29-year sample period, as
the share parameter trends are unlikely to have had more than a few major
turning points.
One detail involves the share parameters for the different age groups in
equations (8).8 There are 120 such parameters. If each is allowed to follow a
fourth-order polynomial, it gives 600 parameters. To avoid such prolifer-
ation, we impose two restrictions: (1) Occupations within each of the three
broad occupational groups (i.e., skilled labor, services, and blue-collar)
have common intercepts in their age-share time polynomials. This reduces
the number of intercepts from 120 to 36. (2) Linear and higher-order terms
in the age-share polynomials are assumed common across all 10 occupa-
tions within each of the 12 education/gender/age groups. This reduces the
number of higher-order terms from 480 to 48.9 Also, in many cases we
found that fourth-order polynomials were not necessary to obtain a good
fit to the data. In these cases we stopped at the third order.
B. Occupational Choice
In each period, workers aged 25–64 choose among 11 alternatives (10
paid occupations and home work). Recall that there are 16 types of work-
ers, distinguished by age-gender-education, and each type faces a different
10-vector of occupational wages. Types also differ in tastes for working in
7 There were three much milder recessions in 1969:4–1970:4, 1980:1–1980:3, and
1990:3–1991:1.
8 Equations (8a)–(8d) each contain four share parameters that sum to one, so they
contain only three free parameters each. We impose the summing to one constant
using a multinomial logit (MNL) transformation. The same is true of eq. (5).
9 Assumption 2 means that if the income share of an age group within a gender/
education category rises in one occupation, it will tend to rise in all occupations.
This does not mean that income shares of gender/education groups will move sim-
ilarly across occupations. How gender and education shares move is determined by
parameters in (3)–(7).
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each occupation. Workers choose among the alternatives on the basis of the
wage vector and their tastes.10 The utility to a worker conditional on choice
of occupation k at time t is given by
Uðg; e; aÞk;t5a0;g;e;k 1 a1wg;e;a;k;t 1 a2ðe2 e¯k;tÞ2 1 a3Pr½dk;t21511 εk;t:
ð10Þ
Here, a0;g;e;k is a nonpecuniary reward that a worker of gender g and edu-
cation level e receives in occupation k. This is assumed to be age and calen-
dar time invariant. In the second term, a1 is a parameter and wg;e;a;k;t is the
wage for a worker of type (g, e, a) in occupation k at time t.
The third term is the difference between a worker’s own education level
and the average level of workers in occupation k. This captures that work-
ers may receive a psychic benefit (cost) from working with other workers
who are similar to (different from) themselves (e.g., college workers are
willing to give up some earnings for more mentally stimulating employ-
ment).11 In the fourth term, dk;t21 is a 1/0 indicator for whether occupa-
tion kwas chosen at t21. Thus, Pr½dk;t215 1 is the proportion of workers
who chose occupation k in the previous year. This is included to capture
persistence in occupational choices.12 Finally, the taste shock εk;t is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (iid) extreme value. This gives
simple MNL forms for the choice probabilities.
The utility of the home alternative differs by age, gender, and calendar
time as follows:
Uðg; e; aÞ0;t5ah0 1 ah1  t1 ðah0;f 1 ah1;f  tÞ  Iðg5 f Þ1 ag;a 1 εh;t: ð11Þ
Here ah0 and aht capture the level and trend in the value of home time
for men, while ah0;f and ah1;f capture deviations in the level and trend for
women.We expect level and trend differences by gender, given the initially
much lower but rapidly rising level of female employment over the sample
period. Of course, the trend for women arises not just from changes in
tastes but also from changes in fertility andmarriage market opportunities,
which we do not model explicitly.
10 Aswages depend only on gender, education, and age—and not on accumulated
occupation-specific or general work experience—workers do not need to consider
any impact of current choices on future wage offers.
11 If this effect exists and we ignore it, labor supply elasticities will be biased
downward. Also, given this effect, the nonpecuniary reward terms a0;g;e;k in (10)
should be interpreted as net of the rewards from being with similar workers.
12 Persistence may arise because of habit persistence or labor adjustment costs at
the individual or aggregate level. For example, a structural motivation fora3 may be
that it is easier to obtain offers from larger sectors. This would hinder small sectors
from growing and discourage large sectors from shrinking, generating persistence
in size of sectors.
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Note that the model has multiple means to explain increasing employ-
ment of women, not just changing “tastes” in (11). For instance, there may
be technical change or demand shifts that drive up income shares for the
service sector occupations, leading in turn to higher wages in (10). Or there
may be female-biased technical change within occupations (eq. [7]).
The term ag;a is a gender/age-specific shifter of the value of home time.
This is meant to capture the lower market participation rate of older work-
ers (as they retire). Finally, εk;t is again an independent type I extreme-value
error term.
Given the setup in (10)–(11), the proportions of workers of type (g, e, a)
who choose to work in occupation k, or who choose the home sector 0, are
given by the MNL expressions
Pðdkt5 1jg; e; aÞ5
exp½Uðg; e; aÞ
k;t

o10k50exp½Uðg; e; aÞk;t
for k5 0; 10: ð12Þ
We are now in a position to state the specific form of the supply function in
equation (1):
Lg;e;a;k;t5D
g;e;a
k ½fwg;e;a;k;tgKk51; Xg;e;a;t5Pðdkt5 1jg; e; aÞ  Xg;e;a;t: ð1′Þ
Finally, we emphasize that the parameters of the individual choice process
(10)–(11) are identified from aggregate choice frequencies of workers in
each of our 16 age-gender-education cells (and how they vary over the
29 years of the data).
C. Educational Choice
At age 19, the members of each entering cohort decide whether to attend
college. Then, at age 25, they enter the labor market, as either college or
high school workers. Recall that youths differ in parental background, de-
noted by b ∈ {<HS, HS, SC, COL} and gender g. The value function asso-
ciated with college attendance for a youth of type (g, b) is given by
VCt ðg; bÞ5 ½f1mIðg5mÞ1 f1f Iðg5 f Þ  E
"
o
64
a525
da225wg;COL;a
#
2f2b
1 ðf3 1 f4t1 f5t2ÞIðg5 f Þ1 ðf6t1 f7t2ÞIðg5mÞ
1 f8Cost1 εC;t:
ð13Þ
Here, E½o64a525da225wg;COL;a is the expected present value of lifetime income
(from age 25 to the end of the working life at age 64) for college work-
ers of gender g. The second term, f2b, is a cost of college that is specific to
a youth’s parental background type b (this is similar to Heckman et al.’s
[1998a, 1998b] approach, except theydefine types usingArmedForcesQual-
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ification Test [AFQT] quartiles instead of parents’ education). The terms
f3through f7 accommodate differences in tastes for college between males
and females, as well as allowing for quadratic trends in these tastes.13 The
termCost is ameasureof tuition costs, and εc;t is a type I extreme-value error.
The εc;t capture unobserved heterogeneity in costs of/tastes for college.
There are two critical things to note about E½o64a525da225wg;COL;a. First,
youths take this expectation assuming that the current-period equilibrium
wage vector will persist into the future. This is a key simplifying assump-
tion that differentiates our work from that of Heckman et al. (1998a,
1998b) and Lee and Wolpin (2006, 2010), who assume that youths fore-
cast the future path of equilibrium wages. Our assumption makes model
solution much simpler, which allows us to have many more types of labor
that are imperfect substitutes.14
Second, the expectation is taken using the probabilities in (12) to integrate
over work and occupational choices a person of type (g, COL) is likely
to make over the life cycle. For example, women tend to have lower ex-
pected earnings than men because they tend to spend less time employed.
The coefficient f1 on expected present value of earnings differs for males
versus females. The constant f3 and trend terms f4 and f5 also shift the
value of college for women. This accounts for gender differences in tastes
for college and/or the nonpecuniary rewards from college (e.g., more of
the return to college for women may come in the marriage market; see
Keane and Wolpin 2010).
The “cost” terms f2b for b ∈ {<HS,HS, SC, COL} capture that youths of
different social backgrounds face different psychic and monetary costs of
college. For example, youths with less educated parents may be less pre-
pared for college, so attendance would require greater effort, or they may
13 College graduates also receive the expected present value of nonpecuniary re-
wards for the occupations they expect towork in (thea0;g;e;k in eq. [10]), which differ
from those of high school graduates. As the a0;g;e;k are time invariant and occupa-
tional choice probabilities vary slowly, these present values will largely be sub-
sumed in the f parameters.
14 We see no philosophical reason to assume that youths can forecast future
wages. Even the assumption that they know the current wage structure exactly is
strong (see Manski 1993; Betts 1996; Dominitz and Manski 1996), though recent
work by Martins (2006), who surveys Portuguese college students, suggests that
“students have a relatively good understanding of [current] market [wage] rates”
(1). Perfect foresight (as in Heckman et al.’s study) or rational expectations (as in
Lee and Wolpin’s) are often invoked not because we believe them but to make
model solution simpler. But here, if youths forecast future wages, it vastly increases
computational difficulty (e.g., in Lee andWolpin [2006, 2010], only six rental prices
need be forecast [as there are six types], but even then they can solve only for an
approximate equilibrium). Of course, our myopia assumption may break down
given a policy change that leads to large predictable changes in the college wage
premium (as people would presumably incorporate large enough changes into their
planning).
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have less taste for education. As for monetary costs, while (13) contains
tuition, this fails to capture other costs of college such as room and board.
Nor do available data capture financial aid well. And even accurate cost
data fail to capture that less educated parents provide less financial aid for
youths to attend college (see Leslie 1984; Keane and Wolpin 2001).
Finally, the value associatedwith stopping school at the high school level
is given by
VHSt ðg; bÞ5 ½f1mIðg5mÞ1 f1f Iðg5 f Þ  E
"
o
64
a525
da225wg;HS;a
#
1 εHS;t: ð14Þ
This value function again involves the expected present value of lifetime
earnings, in this case for workers with a high school education.15We do not
repeat any other terms from (13), as f2b through f7 can all be interpreted as
utilities or costs of college attendance relative to stopping at high school.
Given (13) and (14), the probability a youth of type (g, b) decides to at-
tend college is
Ptðe5COLjg; bÞ5 exp½V
C
t ðg; bÞ
exp½VHSt ðg; bÞ1 exp½VCt ðg; bÞ
: ð15Þ
After the college decision, workers enter the labor market at age 25. Then,
wages are influenced only by a worker’s own education, age, and gender
(parental background no longer matters).16
Given (15), the number of college workers of gender g entering the econ-
omy at time t is
COL25g;t5 o
4
b51
N19g;b;t26  Pt26ðe5COLjg; bÞ: ð16Þ
HereN19g;b;t26 is the number of 19-year-olds of gender g and parental educa-
tion b who enter the model at time t2 6. We take these entering cohort
sizes, which vary substantially over time (see fig. 1, dashed lines), as exog-
enous. This is important for identification (see Sec. II.E).
Ignoring mortality, the stock of 25–34-year-old college workers evolves
as follows:
15 If noncollege types workmore than college types prior to age 25, we will over-
state the college lifetime earnings premium. But this should be largely subsumed in
the intercept of the college attendance decision rule and so have little impact on our
results.
16 Thus, a worker’s wage depends on his or her own schooling (two levels) and
not on parents’ schooling (four levels). This may seem strong, but it is consistent
with the literature onMincer earnings functions, where earnings are typically spec-
ified as a function of own education and experience, and parents’ schooling is rarely
controlled for.
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COLg25–34;t5COL
g
25–34;t21 1COL
g
25;t2COL
g
35;t for g5male; female:
Stocks of college and high school workers in the other age groups evolve in
the sameway. Attrition is also incorporated, using life tables, butwe ignore
it here to simplify notation.
D. Equilibrium Determination of the Capital Stock
We estimate two versions of themodel, with capital treated as exogenous
or endogenous. In the latter case, the optimal capital stock at t equates the
marginal product of capital evaluated at current labor input levels to an ex-
ogenous rental price of capital rCt . Formally,
rCt 5 ∂YtðAt; ffffLg;e;a;k;tg2g51g2e51g4a51g10k51Þ=∂At: ð17Þ
The term rCt can be viewed as a world price of capital not determined in the
model (i.e., it does not depend on model factor supplies). It is assumed to
evolve according to a fourth-order polynomial in time. In estimating this
version of the model, we attempt to fit the capital stock data from 1968–96.
E. Summary and Discussion of Identification and Estimation
The exogenous capital model given by (1)–(16) has 306 parameters, and
the endogenous capital model that adds (17) has 311.Of these, 237 are in the
share equation polynomials, nine are substitution parameters, and two are
TFP parameters, giving 248 technology parameters in all. The occupational
choice model contains 46 parameters, of which 33 are gender/education-
specific tastes for occupations. The college choice equations contain 12 pa-
rameters.
Fitting the model to the PSID data is an iterative process. Starting with a
trial parameter vector, we first solve for the equilibrium of the economy in
each year. Given the sequence of 29 annual equilibria, the model generates
160  29  2 predicted values of type (g, e, a)–specificwages and labor supply
to each occupation over the 29 years and 8  23 predicted college atten-
dance rates for the eight gender/parent education types over 23 years.17 Pa-
rameters are updated to achieve the best fit to these 9,464 data elements via
the method of moments (see online app. A).
The parameters are clearly overidentified: The model attempts to match
income shares for 160 types of labor over 29 years. If share parameters
varied freely across years, we could fit shares perfectly, regardless of how
the substitution parameters rs, ru, rH, rL, ru1, ru2, re, rg, and ra are set, so
substitution elasticities would not be identified. But we constrain the share
17 We fit college attendance rates only up through 1990 because the 1991 cohort
does not finish school until 1997.
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parameters to lie along low-order polynomials in time, allowing identifica-
tion of the substitution elasticities. Low-order polynomials provide a good
fit, implying that the shares do vary slowly over time.
Furthermore, the model also attempts to match occupational employ-
ment shares for each (g, e, a) kind of labor in each of the 29 years. We could
fit these shares perfectly, regardless of how other model parameters are set,
if group-specific tastes for each occupation (the fa0;g;e;kg in eq. [10]) could
vary freely over time. This would leave effects of wages on occupational
choice unidentified. Instead, we constrain these occupational taste param-
eters to be constant over time and age. (Only tastes for home are allowed to
vary by time/age; see eq. [11].)
Within this constrained structure, substitution elasticities are identified
by howwages or income shares respond to variation in the supply ofwork-
ers of different types over time. To gain intuition, it is useful to consider a
CES production function with only two inputs, skilled labor (LSt) and un-
skilled labor (LUt). This generates the following equation for relative wages
(wSt=wUt):
lnðwSt=wUtÞ5 ln½lSt=ð12lStÞ2 ð12 rÞlnðLSt=LUtÞ1 εt; 12 r< 0; ð18Þ
where the elasticity of substitution j51=ð12rÞ. In our framework, tech-
nology (or demand) shocks affecting wages are captured by the ln½lSt=ð12
lStÞ term (the ratio of CES share parameters, which captures SBTC or
other demand shifts). If one can adequately control for the technology term
ln½lSt=ð12lStÞ, then the error εt captures only error in measuring relative
wages and employment usingfinite samples ofworkers. In that case one can
consistently estimate r in (18) by ordinary least squares (OLS). Otherwise,
r confounds the effect of supply-induced movements along the demand
curve with shifts in demand, and onemust instrument for lnðLSt=LUtÞ using
exogenous labor supply shifters.
Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate a version of (18) by OLS, where
LSt and LUt are college and high school labor. They assume that the SBTC
term ln½lSt=ð12lStÞ follows a linear trend. (As we have noted, if shares
were instead allowed to vary freely over time, then r is not identified.) The
linear trend gives a good fit to the data for 1963–87. They estimate SBTC
of 3.3% per year and j 5 1.41. For their estimates to be consistent, it is
essential that SBTC does follow a linear trend. Given our longer period
(1967–96) and finer differentiation of labor, we find that the CES share
parameters must be allowed to follow third- or fourth-order time trends
to provide a good fit to the data.
There remains a concern that εt is contaminated by high-frequency de-
mand shocks, in which case we should instrument for lnðLSt=LUtÞ or esti-
mate the demand function jointly with a labor supplymodel. Heckman et al.
(1998a, 1998b) instrument using cohort size, but we do joint estimation.
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Our supply model (i.e., the college and occupational choice equations) has
several sources of exogenous variation in labor supply.18 Most notable is
variation across cohorts in their size and in the distribution of gender/pa-
rental education types, denoted fN19g;b;t26g in Section II.C. Thus, while past
work typically treats cohort size (and hence parent’s fertility) as exoge-
nous with respect to current demand shocks, we assume that parents’ ed-
ucation is exogenous as well. This is equally plausible. Furthermore, par-
ent education is a good predictor of own education and occupation.
Note that parental education rose substantially (but gradually) across co-
horts (see fig. 1, dashed lines). This exogenously shifts the number of male
and female college graduates in each cohort, which in turn shifts occupa-
tional choices. Substitution elasticities are identifiedbyhowsuch exogenous
(low-frequency) supply shifts affect relative wages (or income shares).19
III. The Data
A. Occupational Employment Shares and Earnings
As described in equations (1) and (2), our model generates annual wages
and employment for 160 types of labor, differentiated by occupation/
education/gender/age, for each year from 1968 to 1996. The wages gener-
ated by the model correspond to annual earnings of full-time-equivalent
workers (FTEs). We build up the employment and wage aggregates using
micro data from the core representative sample of the PSID, which began
collecting data on 5,000 families in 1968.
The procedure is as follows: First, we add up the number of FTEs in each
of the 16 education/gender/age types who chose each of the 10 occupations
each year.20 Thenwe construct aggregate earnings for each of these 160 cells
by summing earnings over all PSID respondents in that cell in that year
(using the PSID core sample weights). Finally, we construct the annual
18 Even if our trends perfectly capture movements in ln½lSt=ð12lStÞ, so εt is only
measurement error, it is desirable that our model contain exogenous (supply-induced)
variation in lnðLSt=LUtÞ. Otherwise, demand shocks would be the only source of
variation in lnðLSt=LUtÞ, and the two regressors in (18) would be collinear except
for functional form.
19 Also note that changes in currentwages cannot influence current supplies of col-
lege graduates by gender/age, as these are predetermined by age 19 college choices.
20 To count FTEswemust define full-time. For example, saywe define a full-time
professional as working 2,400 hours per year. Then a worker whose main occupa-
tion is professional and who works 1,600 hours contributes 0.75 units of labor (of
his or her type) to that sector. He or she also contributes 0.25 units of time to the
home sector. Thus, the number of FTEs assigned to homenot only consists ofwork-
ers who are unemployed or out of the labor force but also includes some fraction of
the time of part-time workers. Of course, how we set full-time hours is merely a
scale normalization that has no bearing on substantive results. Online app. C ex-
plains how we define full-time hours, along with some other details (e.g., how we
handle workers with missing/inconsistent data on hours/earnings).
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wage for an FTE in each of the 160 cells in each year by dividing total
earnings in that cell by the number of FTEs. Wages are converted to 1999
consumer price index (CPI-U) dollars.
A drawback of the PSID is that it is smaller than the Current Population
Survey (CPS), leading to noisy estimates of occupational earnings and
employment. But the key advantage of the PSID is the consistency of its
occupational coding. Occupations are classified by 1970 census codes for
the whole 1968–96 period. In contrast, the CPS changed occupational
codes several times. Consistency in occupational classifications is crucial
to our analysis.21
We define 10 occupations, based primarily on 1970 census one-digit
codes. But in a few cases we disaggregate using three-digit codes. Most no-
tably, we felt the Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers category
covered too wide a skill range. We split it into Professionals and Techni-
cians using three-digit codes (see online app. B); for example, dentists are
“professionals” and dental technicians are “technicians.” Thus, our 10 oc-
cupations (codes in parentheses) are as follows:22
High-Skilled Occupations:
1. Professionals (selected from 001–195; see app. B)
2. Managers and Administrators (201–245)
Service Occupations (Unskilled Group 1):
3. Technicians (selected from 001–195; see app. B)
4. Sales Workers (260–285)
5. Clerical and Kindred Workers (301–395)
6. Service Workers, Except Private Household (901–965)
Blue-Collar Occupations (Unskilled Group 2):
7. Craftsmen and Kindred Workers (401–600)
8. Operatives, Except Transport (601–695)
9. Transport Equipment Operators (701–715)
10. Laborers, Except Farm (740–785)
Work hours and labor income of a PSID respondent are allocated to his or
her main occupation.
21 While the PSIDuses 1970 census codes throughout, the level of detail varied over
time. From 1968 to 1973 and 1975, only one-digit codes were recorded. In 1974,
three-digit codes were recorded. Two-digit codes were recorded in 1976–80, and
three-digit codes were recorded thereafter. The Retrospective Occupation-Industry
Supplemental Data Files, released in 1999, used original interview descriptions of re-
spondents’ occupations to assign three-digit codes back to 1968.
22 We dropped some occupations with consistently low employment: farmers,
farm laborers and supervisors, private household workers, and armed forces per-
sonnel. The self-employed with no reported occupation were also dropped.
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B. College Attendance Rates
A simplifying assumption of our model is that there are two education
types, those with a high school education or less and those who attend col-
lege, regardless ofwhether they complete it. Theuse of twobroad categories
is similar to that in Heckman et al. (1998a, 1998b). As the sampling unit in
the PSID is the household head, information on youths is often scant. Thus,
rather than checking if a youth attended college at, say, ages 18–22, we can
gauge attendance more accurately by looking at age 25 and seeing if he or
she reports attending earlier. (This data limitation is a key motivation for
our assumption that youthsmake educational choices at age 19 and enter the
labor force 6 years later at age 25.) Even then, some PSID waves do not ask
highest grade completed, so college attendance must be inferred in other
ways; for example, a respondent may report finishing high school and re-
port additional school attendance at later ages; from this we infer that he or
she had some college.
We fit college attendance frequencies by cohort (from 1968 to 1990) sep-
arately by gender and parental education (<HS, HS, SC, and COL). We
construct the college attendance rate for a cohort that enters at age 19 in
year t retrospectively by measuring the attendance rate among PSID re-
spondents who are aged 24–26 in year t1 6.We use the 3-year age window
to reduce noise in the measured frequencies (by using more observations).
Of course, this smooths variation in college choice frequencies over time,
but we felt that this trade-off was sensible given that our model is not
meant to predict very short-run movements in college attendance.
Our tuition variable is from theNational Center for Education Statistics
(2003, table 315) and covers in-state tuition and fees for 2- and 4-year col-
leges.23 This is meant to capture the average tuition level faced by those de-
ciding on college attendance. The data are not adjusted for financial aid, nor
do they include indirect costs such as room and board or commuting (note
that Heckman et al.’s study shares the same limitation). We do not include
data on aid because, unfortunately, such data are available only for 1987 on-
ward (from the National Center for Education Statistics National Post-
Secondary Student Aid Study).
C. Other Variables: Cohort Size, Attrition, and the Capital Stock
Our overlapping-generations model requires as inputs (i) the age 25–64
distribution of the population by gender and education in 1968 and (ii) the
cohort sizes of age 19 entrants from 1969 to 1990 (by gender and parental
23 The table presents average undergraduate tuition and fees and room and board
rates paid by full-time-equivalent students in degree-granting institutions for 1964–65
to 2002–3.
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background). We use census data to measure both. Thus, to arrive at our
1968 inputs, the age/education choice proportions computed using the
PSID are used to divide each census age cohort into high school and college
subgroups. Hazard rates from the 1970–90 US Decennial Life Tables pro-
vide attrition rates for each age group. Model inputs are not updated to
account for immigration over the period. (Heckman et al. find that immi-
gration effects are small.)
For our capital stock measure we use Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) estimates of nonresidential fixed investment, from tables 1.1 and 1.2
of the June 2003 National Income and Product Accounts. We add equip-
ment and software and nonresidential structures (omitting government and
residential fixed assets). More detail is provided in online appendix C.
IV. Estimation Results—Production Technology
Wefit ourmodel to the PSIDdata using themethodofmoments (MOM).
Estimation is computationally burdensome: at each trial parameter valuewe
must solve for a 160-dimensional fixed point in each of 29 years. As our fo-
cus is on substantive results, we describe the solution algorithm and the
MOM estimator in online appendix A. As noted earlier, we estimate two
versions of the model, with physical capital treated as exogenous or endog-
enous. Interestingly, parameter estimates and model fit are very similar in
each case. Thus, to conserve on space, we primarily report on the estimates
and evaluation of model fit for the exogenous capital model.24
A. Production Function—Elasticity of Substitution
and TFP Parameters
We begin with table 1, which reports the substitution and TFP param-
eters. At the highest-level CES nest (eq. [3]), we estimate that the elasticity
of substitution between physical capital and skilled labor is 0.47, while that
between the capital1 skilled labor aggregate and unskilled labor is 3.23. As
3.23 > 0.47, we have capital-skill complementarity, consistent with the
findings of Fallon and Layard (1975) and Krusell et al. (2000). Remember,
however, that we define skilled labor on the basis of occupation while they
define it on the basis of education.
Moving down to the next level (eq. [4]), we estimate that the skilled occu-
pations (professionals and managers) are highly substitutable in production
(i.e., jH5 6:25). But for the two unskilled aggregates (services and blue-
collar), substitution is rather inelastic (jL5 0:56). This is intuitive (e.g., it is
easier to substitute an engineer for a manager than a plumber for a nurse).25
24 The endogenous capital model, which has five additional parameters, also pro-
vides a slightly better fit.
25 These elasticities are less precisely estimated than those in the top-level nest.
This occurs for two reasons: (1) Our sources of identifying variation (i.e., changes
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At the next level (eq. [5]), we estimate substitution elasticities among the
four blue-collar occupations that form the blue-collar aggregate and for
the four service occupations that form the service sector aggregate. In each
case, we cannot reject that substitution is unit elastic (as ru1 and ru2 do not
differ significantly from zero—either statistically or quantitatively).
The next level (eq. [6]) describes substitution between college and high
school labor within occupations. We obtain 1.6, which is close to estimates
Table 1
CES Elasticity and TFP Parameters
Exogenous Capital Model
Parameter Name Estimate SE
rs: capital, skilled labor 21.12 (.00)**
ru: capital 1 skilled, unskilled .69 (.02)**
rL: services, blue-collar 2.78 (.45)
rH: professionals, managers .84 (1.56)
ru1: four service occupations .14 (.86)
ru2: four blue-collar occupations .04 (.56)
re: high school, college .38 (.47)
rg: male, female .81 (.27)**
ra: four age groups .90 . . .
Implied Elasticities of Substitution:
j51=ð12rÞ
Exogenous
Capital Model
Endogenous
Capital Model
j1: capital, skilled labor .47 .41
ju: capital 1 skilled, unskilled 3.23 1.75
jL: services, blue-collar .56 .34
jH: professionals, managers 6.25 9.09
ju1: four service occupations 1.16 1.41
ju2: four blue-collar occupations 1.04 1.25
je: high school, college 1.61 1.59
jg: male, female 5.26 4.76
ja: four age groups 10.00 10.00
Scale and neutral technical progress:
b(0) 14.8 .0787**
b(1) .0038 .0019*
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
in the size and “quality”—in terms of parents’ education—of entering cohorts) pre-
dict variation in skilled vs. unskilled labor aggregates better than labor supply to
more narrowly defined occupations, as one would expect. (2) The estimated elastic-
ity of substitution between professionals and managers is very high (6.25). As we
will see in figs. 5 and 9, wages of managers and professionals move quite closely to-
gether. This would be true for awide range of elasticities—as long as they are high—
making the precise elasticity both hard to pin down and, for the same reason, rather
irrelevant. The same issue arises with age elasticities (see below).
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in the prior literature (which, asHeckman et al. note, are centered on 1.4–1.5).
However, ourfigure is not directly comparable to those in theprior literature,
whichhasnotdifferentiated laborbyboth educationandoccupation. Inorder
to obtain the elasticity between total college labor and total high school labor
(asopposed towithin-occupation),wemust simulateanexogenous increase in
the supply of college labor.26
As we note in table 2, simulations of our model imply substitution elas-
ticities for high school and college labor in the range of 1.15–1.26.27 This is
well below the elasticity of 1.6 we obtained for high school and college la-
bor within a one-digit occupation, but it is still well within the range of the
prior literature (e.g., Heckman et al. obtain 1.26 when they instrument for
the college/high school labor supply ratio using cohort sizes). It is intuitive
that different education levels are more easily substitutable within occupa-
tions (e.g., a high school–educatedmanager couldmore easily substitute for
a college-educated manager than a high school–educated laborer could).
The next-lower nest (eq. [7]) describes substitution between males and fe-
males (within education and occupation cells).We estimate that this elasticity
is very high (5.26). Thus, male and female workers appear to have very sim-
ilar skills, conditional on education/occupation. On the other hand, we can
also simulate the elasticity of substitution between total male and female
workers. As we see in table 2, when we do this, the range of elasticities is
1.85–2.20. Thus, not surprisingly, male and female workers appear much less
similar unconditionally.
At the bottom level (eq. [8]), we estimate substitution among age groups
conditional on the gender/education/occupation cell. Our estimates of this
elasticitywere very high, and the algorithmhad a hard time pinning down a
Table 2
Simulated Elasticities
Elasticity Estimates
Exogenous
Capital Model
Endogenous
Capital Model
Groups Min Max Min Max
High school, college 1.15 1.26 1.18 1.30
Male, female 1.85 2.20 2.02 2.20
Skilled, unskilled occupations .72 1.09 1.09 1.26
26 That is, we simulate a “helicopter drop” of college workers, increasing the
number of such workers at each age by the same proportion. These new workers
choose occupations in the same way that workers do normally in the model.
27 The elasticity of substitution between two inputs that appear in a second- or
lower-level nest depends on the share parameters in all common higher nests. As
these share parameters vary over time, so will the substitution elasticities. Thus, for
inputs such as high school and college labor, we cannot give a single elasticity figure
but a range of figures.
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final value. So we decided to peg it at 10. This gives unconditional elastic-
ities in the 4–4.5 range, comparable to Card and Lemieux (2001).
Finally, the estimate of b(1) implies TFP growth of 0.4% per year (the
BEA estimates TFP growth over the 1968–96 period of 0.55% per year).28
Remaining output growth is due to growth of capital and labor and growth
in labor quality via educational/occupational upgrading.
B. Production Function—CES Share/Productivity Parameters
As noted in Section II.A, we let the share parameters vary over time ac-
cording to cubic or quartic trends. There are 237 polynomial parameters.
Given this large number and the fact that polynomial coefficients are very
hard to interpret, we relegate them to online appendix D. Instead, table 3
reports the implied values of the CES share parameters for three selected
years: 1968, 1982, and 1992 (the beginning, middle, and end of our sample).
Of course, to the extent that CES substitution parameters depart from zero
(i.e., from Cobb-Douglas), the “share” parameters are not exactly equal to
income shares. However, their trends over time tell us how demands for
(and income shares of) the various groups move. Some interesting patterns
emerge from the estimates:
First, aswe see in panelAof table 3,while the share of the capital1 skilled
labor composite rises from 1968 to 1982, it falls back to its original level by
1996. And the skilled labor share within the capital1 skilled labor compos-
ite falls slightly. Thus, a general increase in the return to skill does not ex-
plain the rise of the college premiumover this period. This is consistentwith
papers byCard andDiNardo (2002) and Eckstein andNagypal (2004), who
argue that a simple trend in the share of skilled labor cannot explain changes
in the wage structure over the 1970s–90s.
Second, the share of the service occupations (relative to blue-collar) rises
substantially. This implies increased demand for female labor, as women
are more likely to choose that sector.
Third, in panel B of table 3,which reports the shares of high school versus
college workers within occupations, we see that the high school share falls
substantially in six of the 10 occupations: managers, sales workers, service
workers, craft workers, operatives, and laborers. It falls more modestly for
professionals and technicians. (Only for clerical workers and transport op-
eratives does it stay flat.) Thus, a shift in demand toward college labor is
clearly a key factor (along with capital-skill complementarity) in explain-
ing the rise of the college wage premium.
Fourth, in panel C of table 3, which reports gender shares, we see that the
share of high school males (relative to high school females) falls in all 10
28 See “Multifactor Productivity Trends, 1997” (http://www.bls.gov/schedule
/archives/all_nr.htm#PROD3). We may obtain a smaller estimate of TFP growth
because our model better captures skill upgrading of the labor force.
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Table 3
CES Share Parameter Estimates: Selected Years
1968 1982 1996
A. Skill and occupational shares:
(Capital 1 skilled labor) aggregate: ls .261 .374 .262
Capital in (capital, skilled labor) aggregate: lA .846 .969 .902
Unskilled and skill labor aggregates, share of:
Services: lu .297 .434 .614
Professionals: l1 .462 .435 .466
Services aggregate, share of:
Technicians: l3 .248 .324 .363
Sales: l4 .195 .180 .195
Clerical: l5 .355 .320 .271
Blue-collar aggregate, share of:
Craft workers: l7 .493 .538 .534
Operatives: l8 .317 .246 .243
Transport operatives: l9 .115 .136 .150
B. Education shares by occupation: high school share among:
Professionals: m1 .188 .161 .165
Managers: m2 .396 .360 .294
Technicians: m3 .297 .249 .233
Sales workers: m4 .460 .323 .296
Clerical workers: m5 .576 .553 .576
Service workers: m6 .728 .580 .502
Craft workers: m7 .767 .672 .626
Operatives: m8 .912 .777 .742
Transport operatives: m9 .716 .754 .721
Laborers: m10 .826 .735 .558
C. Gender shares by education/occupation:
High school male share of high school labor aggregate among:
Professionals: y1 .718 .704 .633
Managers: y2 .791 .730 .593
Technicians: y3 .616 .677 .568
Sales workers: y4 .763 .767 .683
Clerical workers: y5 .596 .568 .544
Service workers: y6 .713 .644 .622
Craft workers: y7 .788 .820 .751
Operatives: y8 .699 .669 .637
Transport operatives: y9 .897 .809 .778
Laborers: y10 .782 .734 .602
College male share of college labor aggregate among:
Professionals: g1 .754 .725 .642
Managers: g2 .765 .715 .678
Technicians: g3 .650 .594 .574
Sales workers: g4 .960 .754 .651
Clerical workers: g5 .631 .603 .563
Service workers: g6 .688 .700 .719
Craft workers: g7 .778 .753 .783
Operatives: g8 .457 .668 .749
Transport operatives: g9 .717 .803 .787
Laborers: g10 .507 .710 .473
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Table 3 (Continued )
1968 1982 1996
D. Age group shares by gender/education/occupation:
Age group shares of high school male aggregate, skilled
occupations: t1–2:
Age 25–34 .225 .215 .221
Age 35–44 .278 .263 .287
Age 45–54 .267 .279 .277
Age group shares of high school male aggregate, service
occupations: t3–6:
Age 25–34 .252 .241 .248
Age 35–44 .270 .256 .279
Age 45–54 .258 .270 .268
Age group shares of high school male aggregate, blue-collar
occupations: t7–10:
Age 25–34 .249 .238 .245
Age 35–44 .274 .259 .283
Age 45–54 .260 .271 .269
Age group shares of high school female aggregate, skilled
occupations: j1–2:
Age 25–34 .221 .244 .235
Age 35–44 .257 .278 .264
Age 45–54 .254 .245 .282
Age group shares of high school female aggregate, service
occupations: j3–6:
Age 25–34 .228 .252 .244
Age 35–44 .243 .264 .251
Age 45–54 .254 .245 .283
Age group shares of high school female aggregate, blue-collar
occupations: j7–10:
Age 25–34 .229 .253 .244
Age 35–44 .252 .273 .259
Age 45–54 .258 .249 .287
Age group shares of college male aggregate, skilled
occupations: n1–2:
Age 25–34 .221 .217 .235
Age 35–44 .293 .264 .264
Age 45–54 .282 .271 .289
Age group shares of college male aggregate, service
occupations: n3–6:
Age 25–34 .226 .222 .240
Age 35–44 .288 .260 .260
Age 45–54 .282 .271 .288
Age group shares of college male aggregate, blue-collar
occupations: n7–10:
Age 25–34 .237 .235 .252
Age 35–44 .312 .283 .282
Age 45–54 .277 .269 .284
Age group shares of college female aggregate, skilled
occupations: v 1–2:
Age 25–34 .247 .262 .266
Age 35–44 .220 .277 .249
Age 45–54 .298 .233 .270
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occupations. The college male share falls in eight out of 10. Together, the
second and fourth patterns—growing demand for labor in the service
sector and demand shifts toward female labor within most occupations—
can explain both (i) closing gender wage and employment gaps and (ii) the
fact that high school females faredmuch better than high school males over
the 1969–96 period.
Finally, panel D of table 3 reports age group shares. These are very sta-
ble, but there is a weak upward trend for the younger age group (25–34)
among all females and college males.
V. The Occupational Choice Equation
Table 4 reports on the occupational choice equation. The coefficient a1
on the annual wage is .0000862. This implies a labor supply elasticity to a
single occupation of about 4–6 and to the economy as a whole of roughly
0.74 for both high school and college males (the equality is a coincidence)
and 1.13 and 0.94 for college and high school females, respectively. Details
of these calculations are provided in online appendix E. These elasticities
are important for how the model explains changes in the wage structure:
they influence the extent to which wage increases in a sector or occupation
are “choked off” by increased labor supply.
Next, the estimate of a2 implies that workers get a psychic benefit from
working in an occupation inwhich otherworkers have education similar to
their own. And the estimate of a3 implies the existence of mobility costs.
As a result, the increase in labor supply to an occupation resulting from in-
creased labor demand will not be fully realized within one period.
The next panel of table 4 reports the nonpecuniary costs/payoffs (a0;g;e;k)
from working in each occupation for each of the four gender/education
types. These fall into predictable patterns. For instance, women (whether
high school or college educated) have a preference for clerical and service
(i.e., “pink-collar”) occupations and a relative distaste for being laborers.
Table 3 (Continued )
1968 1982 1996
Age group shares of college female aggregate, service
occupations: v 3–6:
Age 25–34 .238 .254 .257
Age 35–44 .212 .268 .240
Age 45–54 .315 .248 .286
Age group shares of college female aggregate, blue-collar
occupations: v 7–10:
Age 25–34 .227 .243 .247
Age 35–44 .192 .243 .219
Age 45–54 .287 .227 .263
NOTE.—Three gender/education/occupation cells were dropped because of extremely small cell counts:
female (college and high school) transport operatives and college female laborers.
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Panel B of table 4 reports parameters related to the value of home time.
As expected, females have a positive intercept shift (ah0;f 52:02), so they
have a higher value of home time than males. But they also have a negative
time trend (ah1; f 5 2 :028). Thus, a declining value of home time (presum-
ably due to declining fertility) explains part of the increase in female labor
supplyover this period. Of course, part is also due to increased demand for
female labor (see Sec. IV.B).
Notably, the occupational choice model (10)–(11) treats the home sector
symmetrically with the various market sectors (occupations). Hence, the
extent to which women shift among occupations in response to shifts in
occupationalwages constrains the extent towhichwe can attribute changes
in their labor force participation to changes in wages. This helps to identify
the part of the change in participation attributable to a changing value of
home time.
Finally, the table reports the gender/age effects in the value of home time
(ag;a in [11]). As expected, these are increasing with age. This is in part how
the model explains retirement.
VI. The College Choice Equation—Explaining the “Stagnating”
Supply of College Labor
Before we discuss estimates of the college choice equation, it is useful to
examine trends in college attendance over the sample period. Figure 1 (top
panel) shows college attendance by cohort for males and females. For males,
the attendance rate was high for the cohort deciding on college in the late
1960s and entering the labor market in the early to mid-1970s. But it declines
quickly over the next several years and then stays fairly flat in the 1980s and
1990s (despite the rising college premium). For females, attendance is flat
over the whole period. The model provides a good fit to this pattern of a
“stagnant” supply of college labor despite rising college wage premia.
The bottom panels of figure 1 show that the model continues to provide
a good fit when the data are broken down by gender/parental education;
for example, the attendance rate for males with high school graduate par-
ents falls from over 60% in the late 1960s to less than 30% in 1990, and the
model captures this dramatic downward trend well. How does the model
explain such patterns?
To answer this question, we first calculate, for each cohort of 19-year-
olds from 1968 to 1996, the expectation, at the time of their college choice,
of the present value of lifetime income for college versus high school work-
ers. This is done using the wage structure at the time of the choice, along
with equation (12), which gives occupation and home choice probabilities,
and with d 5 .95. For males, we find that the (perceived) college lifetime
earnings premium was about $415,000 for the 1968 cohort, narrowed to
$330,000 in the 1974–83 period, widened to $400,000 in 1990, and wid-
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Table 4
Occupational Choice
A. Values of Occupations
Parameter Name Estimate SE
Annual earnings: a1 8.62E205 (2.67E205)**
Education difference: a2 1.24 (.49)*
Lagged occupational choice
probability: a3 1.41 (.42)**
Nonpecuniary Payoffs from Occupations, by
Gender/Education Group (Net of a2 Effect):
a0;g;e;k, g 5M, F, e 5HS, COL, k 5 1, 10
Males Females
Estimate SE Estimate SE
High school graduates:
1. Professionals 21.65 (.07)** 21.31 (.33)**
2. Managers .15 (.18) 1.01 (.21)**
3. Technicians 2.80 (.07)** .50 (.35)
4. Sales 2.55 (.02)** 1.04 (.48)*
5. Clerical 2.24 (.01)** 2.23 (.25)**
6. Service .84 (.20)** 2.50 (.40)**
7. Craft 1.21 2.27
8. Operatives .97 (.04)** 1.76 (.24)**
9. Transport operatives .44 (.00)** 2`
10. Laborers .73 (.20)** 22.08 (.27)**
College graduates:
1. Professionals 2.94 (.80) 2.12 (.27)
2. Managers 2.82 (.78) .33 (.15)*
3. Technicians 2.15 (.43) 1.49 (.06)**
4. Sales 2.95 (.56) .17 (.10)
5. Clerical .17 (.06)** 2.62 (.36)**
6. Service .22 (.04)** 2.05 (.53)**
7. Craft .89 2.77
8. Operatives 2.42 (.18)* .32 (.52)
9. Transport operatives 2.42 (.15)** 2`
10. Laborers 2.46 (.30) 2`
B. Value of Outside Option (Home)
Estimate SE
Constant: ah0 3.29 (.66)**
Time trend: ah1 .0174 (.0046)**
Female constant shift: ah0;f 2.02 (.03)**
Female trend shift: ah1;f 2.0283 (.0048)**
ened further to $480,000 in 1996. Online figure F1 presents these results
graphically.
Next, table 5 reports our estimates of the college choice equation. The
coefficient on the expected present value of lifetime income governs how
the college premium affects college attendance. For males, the coefficient
f1m is .0000134. This implies an elasticity of supply of college labor with
respect to the gain to college of about 3.2.29 This elasticity is important for
how the model explains changes in the wage structure. It governs how
quickly an increased college premium is “choked off” by increased supply
of college labor.
The time trend in male tastes for college is small, implying that tastes
were nearly the same in the 1990s as in 1968. This is important: the model
can explain the puzzle of stagnatingmale college attendance (despite a rising
college wage premium) without resort to declining tastes for college. The
key is the 6–9-point increase in the home share for males discussed below
(Sec. VII). This counteracts the increasing collegewage premium, so the life-
time earnings premium actually falls from $415,000 in 1968 to $400,000 in
1990 (as noted earlier). With an elasticity of 3.2, this implies a 12% drop in
college attendance—about what we see in the data.
For women the situation is reversed. Their college attendance rate fluc-
tuates around 45% throughout the period (see fig. 1), despite (i) increased
demand for female labor (see Sec. IV.B) and (ii) a downward trend in re-
turns to the nonmarket alternative (see Sec. V). These factors caused the
lifetime income gain from college for women to more than double, from
$85,000 in 1968 to $200,000 in 1990 (see fig. F1). Thus, to explainwhy atten-
Age Effects on Value of Outside Option (by Gender): ag;a
Males Females
Age Range Estimate SE Estimate SE
25–34 .00 2.01 (.06)
35–44 .59 (.29)* .00
45–54 1.28 (.37)** .13 (.02)**
55–64 1.85 (.25)** .73 (.03)**
NOTE.—For identification, we normalize (i) the nonpecuniary reward for one occupation for each gen-
der/education group and (ii) the nonpecuniary reward from the outside option for one cell within each age/
gender group. Females rarely chose occupation 9, and female college graduates rarely chose occupation 10,
so we assume away such choices and set their nonpecuniary values to large negative values.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 4 (Continued )
29 For example, as we see in fig. F1, in the 1990 cohort, expected present values of
lifetime income for male college and high school workers were $930,000 and
$530,000, respectively, a $400,000 difference. In fig. 1, we see that the college atten-
dance rate in this cohort was roughly 42%. Say the gain to college increased by 10%,
or $40,000. This increases the latent index for college (eq. [13]) by .54, increasing
attendance to 55.4%, a 32% increase. Thus we get an elasticity of 32/10 5 3.2.
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dance did not increase, the nonmarket return from collegemust have fallen.
This is what the trend coefficients in table 5 imply. Plausibly, this reflects
reduced importance of marriage market returns to college.
The coefficient on lifetime income for women, f1f , is half that for men.
This is consistent with results in Keane and Wolpin (2010) that half of
women’s gain to college comes from better marriage market opportunities
rather than from higher earnings. Affirming this, the present-value-of-
income gains for women are half that of men (see fig. F1), yet their atten-
dance rate is similar.Womenmust getmore utility fromcollege or reap gains
via a different channel (i.e., the marriage market). As we do not model mar-
riage, the model says that women get more utility from college (f354:12).
Besides capturing the downward trends in college attendance for all eight
gender/parent education types, the model also captures level differences
quite well. These level differences are substantial (see fig. 1). For instance,
for males with parent types <HS, HS, SC, and COL, college attendance
rates in 1990were 12.6%, 28.7%, 52.2%, and 72%.Note that it is not a fore-
gone conclusion that the model would capture both level differences and
time trends for all eight gender/parent-education types, as it has no gen-
der/parent–education/time interactions.30
As expected, the fixed effects for parental education figure prominently
in the cost of college. For example, using themale coefficient on earnings to
Table 5
Educational Choice
Parameter Name Estimate SE
Present value of lifetime earnings (males): f1m 1.34E205 (3.07E206)**
Present value of lifetime earnings (females): f1f 6.41E206 (1.30E207)**
Cost of college, by parental background type: f2b:
< High school parents 6.04 (1.96)**
High school parents 4.87 (1.95)*
Some college parents 3.82 (1.95)
College parents 2.90 (1.95)
Female intercept shift: f3 4.12 (1.38)**
Calendar time effects:
Female time trend: f4 1.29E202 (2.47E202)
Female trend squared: f5 26.84E203 (5.48E204)**
Male time trend: f6 9.80E202 (1.23E201)
Male trend squared: f7 23.34E203 (1.29E203)*
Tuition cost: f8 3.53E205 (1.76E204)
NOTE.—The “cost of college” (by parental background type) potentially includes both monetary and
nonmonetary costs, while the tuition cost is just one component of the monetary cost.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
30 Notice that, in fig. 1, college attendance rates trend down for females of all four
parental education types. Yet we also see that the college attendance rate for all fe-
males stayed flat, at roughly 45% because average education levels of parents rose
substantially across these cohorts (as is shown in the dotted lines in fig. 1).
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translate to monetary equivalents, the cost of college is greater by ð4:872
3:82Þ=:00001345 $78; 000 for youthswhose parentswere high school grad-
uates versus thosewhose parents had some college.31 Themagnitude of these
costs is large relative to average tuition levels. Thus, themost plausible inter-
pretation is that they primarily capture psychic/effort costs. Finally, the ef-
fect of tuition is found to be small and insignificant. But as we noted in Sec-
tion III, tuition is a rather poor measure of true college costs.
VII. Evaluation of Model Fit to Wage and Employment Patterns
In this sectionwe evaluate the fit of the model to patterns of occupational
wages and employment shares in the PSID data. Of course, the PSID data
fluctuate fromyear to year because of the relatively small sample size,which
generates noise in population aggregates. Thus, our hope is that the model
will fit the broad trends in the data. The aggregate results (i.e., for all work-
ers) are plotted in online figures F2–F4.
In general, the model appears to do quite well. For instance, it captures
the roughly 10-point drop in the home share from 1968 to 1996 quite accu-
rately (see fig. F4). Other key patterns are that employment shares of pro-
fessionals, managers, and technicians increased substantially, while sales
and services were flat (see fig. F2). Thus, most of the growth of the broad
service sector was from technicians and clerical workers. The shares of all
four blue-collar occupations fell. Themodel captures all these patternswell,
except it understates the growth in clerical workers somewhat. Figure F3
shows that the model also fits occupational wages well—both time trends
within occupations and level differences across occupations.
It is perhaps more interesting and important to evaluate the fit of the
model to the various demographic subgroups. Thus, figures 2–9 assess the
fit to occupation shares and earnings for each of the four gender/education
groups (note that only results for occupations with at least a 2% share are
reported for each group), while figure F4 reports the fit to the home shares.
Given the complexity of the patterns, the fit is surprisingly good.
For high school males, two aspects of the data are notable. First, the home
sector share rises from 15% to 24% during the period (see fig. F4). Second,
in about 1974 wages start to trend down in all four blue-collar occupations
(see fig. 3). The model captures these wage trends well, and it gets the mag-
nitude of the increase in home about right (i.e., 8% predicted vs. 9% data).
The occupation with the largest employment share decline is operatives,
falling from 16% in 1968 to 10% in 1996, a pattern the model captures
almost perfectly (see fig. 2).
For college males, the home share goes from 9% in 1968 to 15% in 1996
(see fig. F4). This is nearly as large as the increase for high school males.
31 Similarly, Heckman et al. obtain a large range of $99,000 in the cost to college
across their four AFQT types.
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Employment shares drop substantially in professional and clerical occupa-
tions, while other occupations are fairly stable (see fig. 4). The model cap-
tures these patternswell.Of course, the largest occupations for collegemales
aremanagers and professionals, followed by technicians. In all three, there is
a clear downward trend in wages for the first half of the sample period and
an upward trend in the second half, with the break point happening in about
1982–83 (see fig. 5). By 1996, real wages for college males in these occupa-
tions are roughly back where they started in 1968. Thus, for males, the
growth in the collegewage premiumover the period as awhole is clearly due
to declining high school wages. Only in the post-1982 period do growing
college wages contribute to the trend. Beaudry andGreen (2005) emphasize
the importance of this pattern, which our model generates.
Next we turn to high school females. In contrast tomales, the home share
falls sharply, from about 69% in 1968 to 47% in 1996 (see fig. F4). The
model predicts a decline from 63% to 47%. Thus, it captures the trend well
but overstates home in the early years.Aswe see in figure 6, the occupations
in which employment increases most are clerical (9% to 19%) and man-
agers (2% to 7%). The model overstates clerical’s share in the early years
by about 4 points (the flip side of understating home). But it captures the
broad upward trend in the clerical sector.
Occupational earnings paths of high school females diverge sharply from
those of high schoolmales (see fig. 7). In almost every occupation they have
at least a mild upward trend inwages over the 1968–96 period. In particular,
the three largest occupations for high school females are clerical (19% in
1996), services (10% in 1996), and managers (7% in 1996). In all three,
wages trended upward. The third-largest is operatives (6% in 1996), where
wages were quite flat. Indeed, high school female wages were flat or mildly
increasing in all blue-collar occupations. But for high school males, wages
fell in all these occupations. Differences are sometimes substantial: for ex-
ample, for operatives,wages of high schoolmales fell about 20%while those
of females were flat; for managers, wages of high school males fell 8%while
those of females doubled. It is difficult to reconcile a view that the rising col-
lege premium represents simply a general increase in returns to skill—or
that males and females are perfect substitutes in production—when high
school females did so well relative to high school males.32 Eckstein and
Nagypal (2004) emphasize this pattern, which our model fits successfully.
32 Part of the relative growth of female wages within education/occupation cells
may be due to skill upgrading via increased work experience. Given the increase in
female employment rates and consensus estimates of experience returns, we calcu-
late that this mechanism is unlikely to raise relative wages of prime working age
women by anymore than 5%. Thus, this mechanism seems unable to explain differ-
ences of the magnitude we see here.
34 Johnson/Keane
F
IG
.4
.—
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
sh
ar
es
(m
al
e
co
ll
eg
e)
:
m
o
d
el
an
d
P
SI
D
F
IG
.5
.—
W
ag
es
(m
al
e
co
ll
eg
e)
:
m
o
d
el
an
d
P
SI
D
36
F
IG
.6
.—
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
sh
ar
es
(f
em
al
e
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l)
:m
o
d
el
an
d
P
SI
D
37
F
IG
.7
.—
W
ag
es
(f
em
al
e
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l)
:m
o
d
el
an
d
P
SI
D
Finally, we consider college females. Their home share also fell sharply,
from 58% in 1968 to 38% in 1996. The model predicts a decline from 58%
to 35% and also matches the time path accurately (see fig. F4).33 The occu-
pations inwhich collegewomen tend towork changedmarkedly aswell (see
fig. 8). In 1968 the largest occupations by far were technicians (15%) and
clerical (14%). As only 42% of college women were employed, these occu-
pations constituted 67% of their total employment. During the sample pe-
riod the share of clerical stayed flat while that of technicians grewmodestly
to 20%. Occupations that grew most were professionals, from 3% to 9%;
managers, from 4% to 9%; and sales, from 1% to 5%. (It is notable that nei-
ther college nor high school females moved in large numbers into “male-
dominated” blue-collar occupations.)
The wages of college women in the professional and managerial occupa-
tions trend up throughout the sample period (133% and 130%, respec-
tively; see fig. 9). This is in contrast to the pattern for college men, where,
as noted earlier, wages in these occupations trend down until about 1983
and up thereafter, ending in 1996 about where they started. In the clerical
occupation, wages of college women were flat, while for college men they
fell sharply (220%). And wages of college women grew sharply in sales,
while for college men they were flat. The model fits all the patterns in
wages and employment for college women quite well. The sharp contrast
with patterns for college men is hard to rationalize if genders are perfect
substitutes.
Figures F5 and F6 break down the changes inwages of college versus high
school workers by gender and age. For men, we see the striking fact, noted
by Card and Lemieux (2001), that the increase in the college premium was
concentrated amongyoungerworkers. For 25–34-year-olds, the college pre-
mium increased from 1.33 in 1980 to 1.60 in 1996.34 But for the other three
age groups no such trend is apparent. The model captures these patterns.
For women, the situation is somewhat different. For 25–34-year-olds,
the college premium increased from 1.37 in 1980 to 1.55 in 1996. But the
college premium increased for 45–54-year-olds as well, from 1.33 to 1.57.
But for them, the college premium was roughly 1.76 in 1968, so it actually
fell over the sample period as a whole. The other two age groups do not re-
veal such patterns. Again, the model captures all these features of the data
quite well. Finally, in the next section, we consider changes in the overall
college wage premium for men and women.
33 The model predicts that home shares of females will cease declining after 1996.
They rise slightly to a plateau of about 37% in 2011 for college females and 48%–49%
for high school females. This appears roughly consistent with recent data.
34 Note that for 25–34-year-old males, average annual earnings for college and
high school workers in 1980 were roughly $44,000 and $33,000, a ratio of 1.33. The
figures for 1996 are $48,000 and $30,000, a ratio of 1.60.
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VIII. Counterfactual Simulations—Factors Driving the
College Wage Premium
Table 6 reports a set of counterfactual simulations designed to shed light
on key factors driving the college/high school wage premium. In the PSID,
themale college premium dropped from 60% in 1968 to a trough of 37% in
1976. It then rose sharply to 70% in 1996.35 For women the premium was
58% in 1968—close to that for men—but it behaved quite differently over
time. It fell to a trough of 45% in 1974 (well above the 37%formen), rose to
a peak of only about 57% in 1987, and was flat from 1988 to 1996 (in con-
trast to the continued rise for men).
Themodel captures these patterns very accurately: In the baseline simula-
tion formen, the college premium falls from 59% in 1968 to a trough of 38%
in 1977. It then rises to 50% in 1985 and 73% in 1996. For women, the col-
lege premium is 58% in 1968, falls to 49% by 1977 (half the drop for men),
rises to 57% in 1985, and then stays fairly flat (reaching 59% in 1996).
We emphasize that the college premium for women was no higher in
1996 than in 1968. This is embarrassing for the SBTC story (even if aug-
mented to include increasing demand for female labor, as in Katz andMur-
phy [1992]). SBTC implies an increasing college premium for women, not
just formen. The reason that the college premium did not rise for women is
that, as we have seen, high school women did rather well over this period.
The different behavior of the college premium formen versuswomen high-
lights the importance of treating them as imperfect substitutes in produc-
tion in order to explain changes in the wage structure.
In our first experiment, we hold all CES share parameters fixed at 1977
levels from 1977 onward. This removes any contribution of skill/occupa-
tion/gender/age-biased technical change (or demand shifts) to changes in
the wage structure in the post-1977 period. For men, the college premium
increases from 38% in 1977 to 56% in 1996 in the experiment, compared
to 73% in 1996 under the baseline. Thus, the model implies that technical
change/demand shifts explain 73 2 56 5 17 out of the 35-point increase
in the college premium from 1977 to 1996.
But the difference between the 1977–85 and 1985–96 subperiods is strik-
ing. In the first period, the model predicts that the male college premium
would have fallen 9 points in the absence of technical change. But in the
35 What the college premium did in the 1990s is controversial. In theMarch CPS,
Card and DiNardo (2002) find that it was flat for males. But Eckstein and Nagypal
(2004), Beaudry andGreen (2005), andAutor, Katz, andKearney (2008) find that it
continued to rise. Results are sensitive to data issues, such as handling top-coded
CPS earnings. Our college premium measure grew more than what these authors
report. The reason may be that we have only two types of labor, so high school
dropouts are groupedwith “high school” and postgraduates are groupedwith “col-
lege.” As Eckstein and Nagypal find, postgraduate wages grew more than college
wages, and dropout wages fell relative to high school wages.
42 Johnson/Keane
1985–96 period the model predicts that the male college premium would
have risen 27 points evenwith no technical change. Thus, themodel implies
that technical change was a key force driving up the premium from 1977 to
1985 but not a major factor from 1985 to 1996.
Now consider the pattern for women. With technology fixed at 1977
levels, the model predicts that the college premium would have fallen
11 points from 1977 to 1996, compared to a baseline increase of 10 points.
Table 6
Counterfactual Experiments: The College/High School Wage Premium under
Alternative Scenarios
Changes
1968 1977 1985 1996 1977–85 1985–96 1977–96
Fix CES share parameters at
values for
Males
Baseline 1.593 1.378 1.498 1.727 112 123 135
1977 1.378 1.289 1.561 29 127 118
Implied impact of
technical change (22) (121) (119)
Females
Baseline 1.584 1.492 1.572 1.589 18 12 110
1977 1.492 1.316 1.379 217 16 211
Implied impact of
technical change (125) (24) (121)
Fix tastes for college at values
for
Males
1968 1.593 1.387 1.527 1.546 114 12 116
Implied impact of tastes
for college (121) (24) (117)
Females
1968 1.584 1.496 1.562 1.412 17 215 28
Implied impact of tastes
for college (11) (117) (118)
Fix value of outside option
(females) at value for
Males
1968 1.593 1.379 1.502 1.733 112 123 135
Implied impact of female
labor supply (0) (0) (0)
Females
1968 1.584 1.483 1.550 1.557 17 11 18
Implied impact of female
labor supply (11) (11) (12)
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Thus, technical change accounts for a 21-point increase in the college pre-
mium for women. As technical change can “explain” 200% of the in-
crease, the rise in the college premium for women was substantially damp-
ened by other factors.
Again, the difference between the 1977–85 and 1985–96 periods is strik-
ing. In the earlier period the model predicts that without technical change
the college premiumwould have fallen 17 points, compared to the observed
8-point increase. But in the latter period the model predicts only a small in-
crease in the college premium forwomen, with orwithout technical change.
So again, as with men, technical change was much more important in the
earlier period.
As is clear from figure 1, college attendance rates were very high in co-
horts that made college attendance decisions in the late 1960s and entered
the labor market in the early 1970s. But shortly thereafter they fell quite
quickly.Card andLemieux (2001) argued that this reduced supplyof college
graduates was an important factor driving up the college wage premium. In
our second experiment, we hold tastes for college fixed at the 1968 levels.
In light of the discussion of Section VI, the main implication is that college
attendance rates will rise substantially among women (while remaining rel-
atively stable for men). Of course, this will also affect men because, as dis-
cussed in Section IV.A, college men and women are highly substitutable.
For men, under the experiment, the increase in the college premium
over the whole 1977–96 period is 16 points, compared to 35 points under
the baseline. Thus, the “stagnation” of the flow of college graduates start-
ing in the early 1970s does explain a large fraction of the growth in the col-
lege wage premium.36 Note also that the experiment has almost no effect on
the college premium in the first period (1977–85). But in the latter period
(1985–96) there would have been almost no growth in the college premium
if college enrollment had grown as expected given 1968 preferences. These
results appear broadly consistent with the Card-Lemieux argument.
For women, the pattern is very similar. With preferences fixed at 1968
levels, the model predicts that the college premium would have actually
fallen 8 points over the whole 1977–96 period (compared to the 10-point
increase in the baseline). As with men, the impact of the increased supply
of college labor under the experiment arises entirely in the 1985–96 period.
Thus, the data appear broadly consistent with a pattern in which techni-
cal change/demand shifts drove up the college premium for both men and
women in 1977–85, by 21 and 25 points, respectively, while relative scar-
city of (mostly female) college labor drove up the college premium for both
men and women in the 1985–96 period, by 21 and 17 points, respectively.
36 It should be recalled, however, that the model does not explain why female
tastes for college fell in this period. Those tastes are treated as unknown parameters.
In Sec. VI we argued it is plausible that they actually reflect reduced marriage mar-
ket returns to college.
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Finally, our third experiment looks at the effect of the substantial entry
of women into the labor force over the 1968–97 period. Our model attri-
butes this in part to risingwages and in part to a decline in the value of home
time for women. The experiment holds the value of the home option fixed
at the 1968 level, thus eliminating the supply shift. Strikingly, the increased
supply of women had essentially no impact on the college premium for
either men or women. In hindsight this is not surprising as college atten-
dance rates were similar for men and women. Thus, the increased supply of
women had little impact on the relative supply of college labor.
IX. Conclusion
We have developed and estimated an equilibrium model of the US labor
market using PSID data from 1968–96. A key feature of the model is that
many types of labor, differentiated by education, gender, occupation, and
age (giving 160 types), are treated as imperfect substitutes in production.We
show that our model succeeds in fitting many aspects of the changing wage
structure that are difficult to explainwithout treating all these groups as im-
perfect substitutes.
For example, within occupation/education cells, wages generally fell for
high school men while rising for high school women. This is difficult to ex-
plain ifmen andwomen are perfect substitutes in production. Similarly, over
the sample period as a whole the college premium rose only for younger
males and females (it actually fell for females in the 45–54 age range). This
is hard to explain if age groups are perfect substitutes.
Our model also succeeds in fitting a number of patterns that are difficult
to reconcilewith a simple SBTC story for the changingwage structure (even
if augmented to include a demand shift toward female labor). Most notable
is that high school females did so well, in terms of both wages and employ-
ment, relative to high schoolmales.37 Indeed, over the period as a whole, the
college wage premium rose for men but not for women. This is an embar-
rassing pattern for the SBTC story as it should imply an increase in the col-
lege premium for both women and men.
Our model fits not just wages but occupational employment and college
attendance rates. With a few exceptions, it fits patterns of wages, employ-
ment, and college attendance rather well for all 160 types of labor over the
whole 29-year period.38 It achieves this using six main factors: (i) our CES
37 As Eckstein andNagypal (2004) note, this is hard to reconcile with a view that
the college premium rose because of a general increase in the skill rental price (es-
pecially as the relative supply of high school females rose substantially).
38 One might argue that we should fit time paths of wages and employment well
simply because we allow the share parameters to follow time polynomials. But we
do not include any occupation/education/gender/age interactions. Thus, it is not at
all obvious that we could obtain a good fit to wage and employment paths for all
160 types of labor.
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production function exhibits capital/skill complementarity; (ii) trends in
CES share parameters imply increased labor demand in female-dominated
service occupations relative to blue-collar; (iii) the high school share falls
dramatically in six out of 10 occupations and modestly in two others (but
not in clerical, the largest occupation for high school females); thus, a form
of SBTC (i.e., increasing relative demand for college labor) is present in
most occupations; (iv) the demand formales fell relative to females in 18 out
of 20 occupation/education cells; (v) the value of home time fell for women,
presumably capturing declining fertility; and (vi) female tastes for col-
lege trended down (consistent with reduced marriage market returns to
college).
Notably, the share of the skilled labor aggregate did not increase, con-
trary to a simple SBTC story. Instead, factor ii illustrates the pointmade by
Eckstein andNagypal (2004) andKambourov andManovskii (2008, 2009a,
2009b) that occupational demand shifts are important for understanding
changes in the wage structure. We find that occupation-specific demand
shifts for different types of labor are also important (factors iii and iv). Fac-
tor iv could be called “gender-biased” technical change. This is plausible,
for example, if women have better communication skills that are comple-
ments with improved communication technology. But it may also capture
omitted factors, such as reduced discrimination or increased work experi-
ence of women within cells.
It is useful to contrast our results with those of Lee and Wolpin (2010).
In their model, genders are perfect substitutes, so the gender wage gap falls
because of skill upgrading: an exogenous decline in fertility and a demand
shift toward services led women to expect to work more. So they invest
more in human capital. But this may not adequately explain the growth of
female relative wages within education/occupation cells or the failure of
the college premium to increase for women.39
Finally, a success of our model is that, for males, it provides an explana-
tion for the puzzle (noted by Card and Lemieux [2001]) that their college
attendance rate stagnated from 1968 to 1990 despite a sharp increase in the
college wage premium. And it does so without the need to resort to chang-
ing tastes for college. The point is that the expected lifetime earnings pre-
miumactually fell from1968 to 1990 as a result of decliningmale labor force
participation. This was due, in turn, to declining demand for labor in male-
dominated occupations.
Finally, two important limitations of our analysis are worth emphasiz-
ing. One is that we do not allow for skill heterogeneity within our 160 oc-
39 Increased experience may explain part of the growth of female wages within
cells, but in Sec. V we argued that, given plausible experience returns, it could not
explain it fully. Also, employment increased by similar amounts for college and
high school women. So this does not help explain why the college premium did not
rise for women.
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cupation/education/gender/age cells. Thus, our model is silent on factors
that may have led to increased inequality within these cells. Work that
emphasizes heterogeneity includes Galor and Moav (2000) and Lee and
Wolpin (2010). Another limitation is that we do not model on-the-job
skill acquisition as in Heckman et al. (1998a, 1998b). As we have empha-
sized, these key simplifications allow us to handle many more types of
labor than in these earlier studies. Future work should strive to unify these
approaches in a tractable framework.
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